Essays In Algorithmic Market Design Under Social Constraints

Rapid technological advances over the past few decades---in particular, the rise of the internet---has significantly reshaped and expanded the meaning of our everyday social activities, including our interactions with our social circle, the media, and our political and economic activities This dissertation aims to tackle some of the unique societal challenges underlying the design of automated online platforms that interact with people and organizations---namely, those imposed by legal, ethical, and strategic considerations. I narrow down attention to fairness considerations, learning with repeated trials, and competition for market share. In each case, I investigate the broad issue in a particular context (i.e. online market), and present the solution my research offers to the problem in that application. Addressing interdisciplinary problems, such as the ones in this dissertation, requires drawing ideas and techniques from various disciplines, including theoretical computer science, microeconomics, and applied statistics. The research presented here utilizes a combination of theoretical and data analysis tools to shed light on some of the key challenges in designing algorithms for today\u27s online markets, including crowdsourcing and labor markets, online advertising, and social networks among others

SSVEP Extraction Applying Wavelet Transform and Decision Tree With Bays Classification

Background: SSVEP signals are usable in BCI systems (Brain-Computer interface) in order to make the paralysis movement more comfortable via his Wheelchair.Methods: In this study, we extracted The SSVEP from EEG signals, next we attained the features from it then we ranked them to obtain the best features among all feature and at the end we applied the selected features to classify them. We want to show the degree of accuracy we applied in this work.Results: In this study Bayes (applied for classifying of selected features) got the highest level of accuracy (83.32%) with t-test method, until the SVM took the next place of having the highest accuracy to itself with t-test method (79.62%). In the next place according to the feature selection method, decision tree took the next place with Bayes classification (79.13%) and then with SVM classification (78.70%).Conclusion: Bays obtained the better results to itself rather than SVM with t-test

A Moral Framework for Understanding of Fair ML through Economic Models of Equality of Opportunity

We map the recently proposed notions of algorithmic fairness to economic models of Equality of opportunity (EOP)---an extensively studied ideal of fairness in political philosophy. We formally show that through our conceptual mapping, many existing definition of algorithmic fairness, such as predictive value parity and equality of odds, can be interpreted as special cases of EOP. In this respect, our work serves as a unifying moral framework for understanding existing notions of algorithmic fairness. Most importantly, this framework allows us to explicitly spell out the moral assumptions underlying each notion of fairness, and interpret recent fairness impossibility results in a new light. Last but not least and inspired by luck egalitarian models of EOP, we propose a new family of measures for algorithmic fairness. We illustrate our proposal empirically and show that employing a measure of algorithmic (un)fairness when its underlying moral assumptions are not satisfied, can have devastating consequences for the disadvantaged group's welfare

Fairness Behind a Veil of Ignorance: A Welfare Analysis for Automated Decision Making

We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems---namely risk and welfare considerations. Our proposed family of measures corresponds to the long-established formulations of cardinal social welfare in economics, and is justified by the Rawlsian conception of fairness behind a veil of ignorance. The convex formulation of our welfare-based measures of fairness allows us to integrate them as a constraint into any convex loss minimization pipeline. Our empirical analysis reveals interesting trade-offs between our proposal and (a) prediction accuracy, (b) group discrimination, and (c) Dwork et al.'s notion of individual fairness. Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, our work provides both heuristic justification and empirical evidence suggesting that a lower-bound on our measures often leads to bounded inequality in algorithmic outcomes; hence presenting the first computationally feasible mechanism for bounding individual-level inequality.Comment: Conference: Thirty-second Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2018

Beneficent Intelligence: A Capability Approach to Modeling Benefit, Assistance, and Associated Moral Failures through AI Systems

The prevailing discourse around AI ethics lacks the language and formalism necessary to capture the diverse ethical concerns that emerge when AI systems interact with individuals. Drawing on Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach, we present a framework formalizing a network of ethical concepts and entitlements necessary for AI systems to confer meaningful benefit or assistance to stakeholders. Such systems enhance stakeholders' ability to advance their life plans and well-being while upholding their fundamental rights. We characterize two necessary conditions for morally permissible interactions between AI systems and those impacted by their functioning, and two sufficient conditions for realizing the ideal of meaningful benefit. We then contrast this ideal with several salient failure modes, namely, forms of social interactions that constitute unjustified paternalism, coercion, deception, exploitation and domination. The proliferation of incidents involving AI in high-stakes domains underscores the gravity of these issues and the imperative to take an ethics-led approach to AI systems from their inception

The AI Incident Database as an Educational Tool to Raise Awareness of AI Harms: A Classroom Exploration of Efficacy, Limitations, & Future Improvements

Prior work has established the importance of integrating AI ethics topics into computer and data sciences curricula. We provide evidence suggesting that one of the critical objectives of AI Ethics education must be to raise awareness of AI harms. While there are various sources to learn about such harms, The AI Incident Database (AIID) is one of the few attempts at offering a relatively comprehensive database indexing prior instances of harms or near harms stemming from the deployment of AI technologies in the real world. This study assesses the effectiveness of AIID as an educational tool to raise awareness regarding the prevalence and severity of AI harms in socially high-stakes domains. We present findings obtained through a classroom study conducted at an R1 institution as part of a course focused on the societal and ethical considerations around AI and ML. Our qualitative findings characterize students' initial perceptions of core topics in AI ethics and their desire to close the educational gap between their technical skills and their ability to think systematically about ethical and societal aspects of their work. We find that interacting with the database helps students better understand the magnitude and severity of AI harms and instills in them a sense of urgency around (a) designing functional and safe AI and (b) strengthening governance and accountability mechanisms. Finally, we compile students' feedback about the tool and our class activity into actionable recommendations for the database development team and the broader community to improve awareness of AI harms in AI ethics education.Comment: 37 pages, 11 figures; To appear in the proceedings of EAAMO 202

Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Models

Major advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) increasingly take the form of developing and releasing general-purpose models. These models are designed to be adapted by other businesses and agencies to perform a particular, domain-specific function. This process has become known as adaptation or fine-tuning. This paper offers a model of the fine-tuning process where a Generalist brings the technological product (here an ML model) to a certain level of performance, and one or more Domain-specialist(s) adapts it for use in a particular domain. Both entities are profit-seeking and incur costs when they invest in the technology, and they must reach a bargaining agreement on how to share the revenue for the technology to reach the market. For a relatively general class of cost and revenue functions, we characterize the conditions under which the fine-tuning game yields a profit-sharing solution. We observe that any potential domain-specialization will either contribute, free-ride, or abstain in their uptake of the technology, and we provide conditions yielding these different strategies. We show how methods based on bargaining solutions and sub-game perfect equilibria provide insights into the strategic behavior of firms in these types of interactions, and we find that profit-sharing can still arise even when one firm has significantly higher costs than another. We also provide methods for identifying Pareto-optimal bargaining arrangements for a general set of utility functions.Comment: 36 pages, 8 figure

Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority?

With Artificial Intelligence systems increasingly applied in consequential domains, researchers have begun to ask how these systems ought to act in ethically charged situations where even humans lack consensus. In the Moral Machine project, researchers crowdsourced answers to "Trolley Problems" concerning autonomous vehicles. Subsequently, Noothigattu et al. (2018) proposed inferring linear functions that approximate each individual's preferences and aggregating these linear models by averaging parameters across the population. In this paper, we examine this averaging mechanism, focusing on fairness concerns in the presence of strategic effects. We investigate a simple setting where the population consists of two groups, with the minority constituting an {\alpha} < 0.5 share of the population. To simplify the analysis, we consider the extreme case in which within-group preferences are homogeneous. Focusing on the fraction of contested cases where the minority group prevails, we make the following observations: (a) even when all parties report their preferences truthfully, the fraction of disputes where the minority prevails is less than proportionate in {\alpha}; (b) the degree of sub-proportionality grows more severe as the level of disagreement between the groups increases; (c) when parties report preferences strategically, pure strategy equilibria do not always exist; and (d) whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, the majority group prevails 100% of the time. These findings raise concerns about stability and fairness of preference vector averaging as a mechanism for aggregating diverging voices. Finally, we discuss alternatives, including randomized dictatorship and median-based mechanisms.Comment: To appear in the proceedings of AAAI 202